

# **Database Assessment**

**Vulnerability Assessment Course** 

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# Agenda

- Introduction
- Configuration Guidance
- Operating System Configuration
- Database Installation
- Default Database Configurations
- Identification and Authentication
- Auditing and Monitoring
- Overview of Oracle Testing
- Overview of SQL Server Testing

## Introduction



- Database Security focuses on the use of database management systems to protect systems and data from unauthorized:
  - Access
  - Creates
  - Reads
  - Updates
  - Deletes





# **Relational Database Management Systems**

- Sublanguages
  - Data Definition Language (DDL) defines structure
  - Data Control Language (DCL) defines security/access controls
  - Data Manipulation Language (DML) for data query/updates
- Interface drivers code libraries for prepare statements, execute statements, and fetch results
  - SQL\*Net/Net8
  - Open Database Connectivity (ODBC)
  - Java Database Connectivity (JDBC)
- SQL Engine interprets/executes DDL, DCL, and DML
- Other Engines
  - Transaction statements either succeed or fail as a group
  - Relational integrity constraints
  - Storage data modification, commit/rollback, and backup/recovery

#### **Breadth of Technology**

- Examples of Databases
  - Oracle
  - Microsoft SQL
  - MySQL
  - DB2
  - Informix
  - TeraData
  - Sybase
- Examples of Database Applications
  - Oracle Financials
  - SAP
  - SAS



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## Considerations



- Majority of tests performed on live production systems
  - Limit to non-destructive testing
  - Penetration testing vs. Vulnerability Assessment/Compliance
- Database similarities allow for similar tests
  - Different products use different commands/procedures
  - Features are similar yet different between products
- Must be very familiar with the product and add-ons to
  - Eliminate false positives
  - Be taken seriously by administrators
  - Know most important product add-ons
  - Where is the database within the system architecture
  - Understand the database purpose



# **Security Configuration Guidance**

- DISA Guidance Secure Technical Implementation Guides (STIGS) and Checklists
- NSA Security Configuration Guidance
- NIST Security Configuration Checklists
- Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks
- Vendor Database Security Guidance



## What is a STIG?



What is a Database STIG?

- Guidance on technical security policy, requirements, and implementation details
- Covers major vendors' database product
- Provides classification guidance for weaknesses found
- What it is not?
  - Step by step implementation guide
  - Guidance to be taken literally
  - Always consistent and up to date
  - Always applicable to commercial or non-DoD environments

## What Else Is It Not?





## **Common Pitfalls**



- Guidance can be out-of-date
  - Covers only the "core" product
  - What about add-on options?
  - Some add-on options are not so optional
  - Infrastructure and system architecture in which the DB operates not taken into account
- Familiarity with a variety of vendor add-on products or 3<sup>rd</sup> party tools used to
  - Manage the database
  - Monitor the database
  - Backup the database
  - Perform ETL operations on the database
  - Authentication constraints imposed by tools
  - Permissions required to run tools
  - Constraints imposed by application using DB



# **Operating System Configuration**

- Permissions on the OS directories and on the binary files
  - Why bother to break into the database if you can just take the database files
- Permissions of critical configuration files
- Permissions of installation, log, trace, and files

## **Database Installation**



- Root of many problems
  - "All or nothing" option when installing some products
- Removal of options difficult if not impossible
  - If at all possible, vendor technical services needed in some cases
- Demonstration code in the database and on the binary install base
- Java Virtual Machines (JVM) and Java Runtime Environments (JRE) inside the database and in the binary install base
- Fully functioning, unsecured J2EE containers
- DBMS version maintenance
- Updated patch and fix installation



## When Your Database Looks Like The Web

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Method Summary	
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HttpSoap11 getProperty ()	
Synchronous invocation of operation: getProperty	
HttpSoap11 propertyNames ()	
Synchronous invocation of operation: propertyNames	
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#### **Default Oracle LISTENER Configuration 10g**

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\$ lsnrctl status		
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Copyright (c) 1991, 2005,	Oracle. All rights reserved.	
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Alias Version Start Date Uptime Trace Level Security SNMP Listener Parameter File Listening Endpoints Summar (DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(I (DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(I (DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(I)))	LISTENER TNSLSNR for Solaris: Version 10.2.0.1.0 - Production 01-MAR-2007 11:05:35 0 days 0 hr. 40 min. 21 sec off ON: Local OS Authentication OFF /export/oracle/10g/network/admin/listener.ora /export/oracle/10g/network/lag/listener.log PROTOCOL=ipc>(KEY=EXTPROC2>>>) PROTOCOL=ipc>(KEY=EXTPROC2>>>) PROTOCOL=tcp>(HOST=============>)(PORT====================================	on ntat
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# More Exploits, No Checklists

#### Previous examples showed default installation issues

- Database is no longer accessible with SQL\*Net only
- JRE installed as an external component to the database
- Internal JVM is another potential vulnerability

#### Next example demonstrates

- Behavior of invoker vs. definer rights
- PUBLIC assignment of privileges
- Exploit using both to elevate user privileges from next to none to DBA
- What you should take away from these examples
  - Some guidance does not always address vulnerabilities
  - Gap needs to be addressed by manual testing and ad-hoc probing
  - There are no checklists for this!

#### **Escalation of privileges**



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- Unpatched Oracle 9i
- Create user (TEST)
- Minimal privilege (CREATE SESSION and PUBLIC privileges)
- TEST user executes CTXSYS package with rogue command
- TEST user has DBA privileges

# **DBA Role**



- DBA role is very powerful and access to it should be restricted
- Verify that any database account granted the DBA role is explicitly authorized
- Individual DBA accounts should be created for each DBA
- DBA accounts used only for DBA functions



# **Identification and Authentication**

#### OS-based authentication mode

- Different databases, different modes
  - MS SQL Server Windows or server authentication
  - Oracle OS authentication or remote authentication

#### Default or blank passwords

- Oracle accounts...too many!!!
  - 483 unique default accounts
  - 46 accounts have multiple default passwords, depending on version
  - 597 total default password possibilities
- Oracle LISTENER security
  - Local OS authentication is used for listener security in Oracle
    10g and higher version
  - Prior to 10g, password did not follow best practices
    - Age, strength, history, and lockout



# **Oracle Connection Security**

- listener.ora file
  - Program = extproc



#### sqlnet.ora file

- TCP.VALIDNODE\_CHECKING= yes
- TCP.INVITED\_NODES = list of accepted TCP/IP addresses
- TCP.EXCLUDED\_NODES = list of unallowed TCP/IP addresses





# **Database Links and Remote Connections**

- Available for almost all databases
- Are they required for this database to operate?
- Ensure that the database object containing the link and password information is not accessible

## **Data Confidentiality**



#### Data in transit

- Per default, database connections are not encrypted
- Some vendors' encryption capabilities are add-on purchases and expensive
- Consider encrypting JDBC connections

#### Data at rest

- Encryption of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) data in the database
- Encryption of database data means
  - Examine any custom code used to encrypt data
  - Examine the encryption algorithms used and the implementation details
  - Some use Vormetric or Decru...issues with key management
- Newer versions of Oracle and SQL Server offer data encryption

# **Data Integrity**



- Assurance that data is consistent throughout various data operations
- Most guidance does not cover this aspect
- Application and business process dependent
- Highest levels of data integrity are in databases with rigid business process frameworks like Oracle Financials and SAP
- Both Oracle and SQL Server allow developers to wrap custom code
  - SQL Server Encrypted Stored Procedures
  - Oracle Database Source Code Object Encryption/Encoding



# Auditing and Monitoring – A Sore Subject

- Auditing and Monitoring is resource intensive
  - Human resources
  - Computing resources
- Different audit settings for different databases
  - Audit the privileged and database users
  - Various level of audit settings
  - Location of audit data
    - Choice of OS, DB, extended, XML (Oracle)
    - Set audit destination (SQL Server)
  - Permissions on audit data files
- Most guidance is excessive balance it with resources
- Frequently no auditing is performed at all
- Fine-grained auditing installed 90%, but only used 10% of time



## **Backup and Recovery**

- Main focus is on backup procedures
  - Poor OS permissions
  - "Cold" backup files entire database at a point in time
  - "Hot" backup or archive log files incremental data changes written to the redo logs
- Backup can also mean a quick export file, which may have World OS permissions
- Backup procedure usually involves
  - Oracle Recovery Manager (RMAN)
  - SQL Server Management Studio
  - Third-party backup tool



# **Overview of Oracle Testing**

- Built-in users installed with excess privileges
- Default passwords and roles assigned to users
- Demo and sample schemas; well known passwords
- All or most users assigned to default tablespaces
- Users have SYSTEM tablespace assigned
- Every DBA uses SYSTEM or SYS account to manage database
- Database was not patched after installation
- Specific parameters left at default setting
- Default profiles used
- No or inadequate password management
- LISTENER has default port, name, and no security settings
- Audit not enabled



# **Overview of SQL Server Testing**

- Big differences between SQL Server 2000, 2005, and 2008
- Built-in user account name left unchanged
- Guest User account enabled in database
- SA account password left null
- SYSADMIN fixed server role assigned to BUILTIN/ Administrators
- Fixed server and database roles used instead of custom roles
- Xp\_cmdshell not removed
- Demo databases installed on the server
- DBMS object permissions granted to PUBLIC role
- SQL Server vs. Windows authentication
- Audit not enabled; audit flags not set

# Questions



